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THE FIRST BOOK IN ENGLISH ON THE LAW OF
INCORPORATION.
The first English book on the Law of Corporations was
published in London, 1659, and was written by William Sheppard,
the author of the more famous book. "The Touchstone of Common
Assurances."
Sheppard was a lawyer of large country practice, and the author
of several other law books, well known in their day.
He was invited to London by Cromwell about 1653, and became
a clerk of the upper bench, in 1656 he was made a sergeant-at-law.
and one of the four clerks appointed to draw up charters granted
by Cromwell to town corporations. In 1657 he petitioned Crom-
well for an increase of salary, then £3oo a year, representing that he
had suffered a loss of income by giving up his country practice. He
obtained an increase of LioO a year.
In 1659 he was appointed a puisne Justice of the County Pala-
tine, but upon the Restoration the next year, he was deprived of
the office and fell into obscurity.'
Allibone2 tersely says: "He was a learned law writer, who.,e
adherence to Cromwell precluded his books from the respectful
recognition of his legal successors."
'Dictionary of National Biography, article on William Sheppard.
2Dict. of Eng. Lit., article "William Sheppard."
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
The titles of twenty-four of his works are given in the Dictionary
of National Biography, and among them, No. 18. is the book in
question: "Of Corporations, Fraternit*ies and Guilds." there said
to be in octavo, but the copy before me is only five and a half by
three and three-quarter inches, although it has evidently been cut
down a little, some time, in binding.
That it is the first English book on the subject appears from
the author's own statement in the preface, addressed: "To my
Dear Country-men," as follows:
"I thought therefore that nothing would be more acceptable to
my country-men than a discourse in this kind of learning, the
rather because no man's pen amongst us, has been employ'd on
this subject before."
The next English book on Corporations was published anonym-
ously in London in 17o2. It is sometimes called the first book in
English on this subject,' but in the preface the author says that
Sheppard's is the only one previously written, and he plumes him-
self on having so much more to say:
"I remember not any Treatise designedly written on
this Subject except a little Duodecimo by Mr. Sheppard,
which extends not to the fortieth part of the matters
relating to Corporations." 2
Sheppard's book is now very rare. It seems to have dropped
out of sight during the last two centuries. Enquiry for it of the
various great libraries in Boston, Cambridge, New York, Albany
and Washington has failed to bring a copy to light.
Sheppard is better known as the author of "The Touchstone of
Common Assurances," published in London in 1641. This work,
with its quaint, happy title, is not-included in the list of twenty-four
books written by Sheppard, in the Dictionary of National Biog-
raphy. In the preface to the fourth edition the editor, Edward
Hilliard, says:
"For a long time the Touchstone lay on the stalls of
the second-hand booksellers in Moorfields. unnoticed and
12 Harv. Law Rev. i io, note: "This is the first English book wholly de-
voted to the subject of Corporations."
2The Dict. of Nat. Biog. speaks of Sheppard's book as an octavo. Were
there two editions ?
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of no repute. The late Lord Chief Justice Willes1 was the
person who rescued it from unmerited neglect, by the
high character he gave it in the court where he presided.
Tho' this treatise bears the name of Sheppard, yet doubts
have arisen whether it be really his performance. * * *
A note by a conveyancer, Booth, in a copy of the Touch-
stone reads: 'No part of this book is Sheppard's but the
title; for it was originally wrote by Justice Doderige,
whose library Sheppard purchased, where, among other
books, he found the original manuscript of this treatise,
and afterwards published it as his own. Sir Creswell
Levinz had seen the manuscript in Justice Doderige's
hands and from him Mr. Pigott, who was my author, had
this information."
But this story, as well as the oblivion into which all of Shep-
pard's law books fell, may have resulted, as stated by Allibone,
from the fact that he was an ardent Cromwellian. It may be that
the manuscript seen in Justice Doderige's hands was Sheppard's
own manuscript.
"In the first publication of this work Mr. Sheppard is accused
of having assumed the laurels that belonged to another, for this
excellent treatise is said to have been compiled by Joseph Dod-
deridge; yet notwithstanding this conjecture, it is to be observed
that great part of the Touchstone is founded upon the authority of
Co. Lit. which was first published in 1628 (4 Car. i) the year that
judge Dodderidge died, and that in all the other works ascribed to
him" (Dodderidge) "there does not occur a single reference to that
work. It is further observable that in the Touchstone, pp. 67, 166,
266 and 239, references occur to Cases in 5 and 6 Car. i, and also,
in the edition of 1648, to Cases in 23 Car. 1.12
'In Roe vs. Tranmer, 2 Wils. Rep. 75 at 78 in 1757-the Chief Justice
said: "I rely much on Sheppard's Touchstone of Common Assurances, 82, 83
(which is a most excellent book) * * * " It is remarkable that this mild enco-
mium should have rescued the book from oblivion after more than a century's
neglect.
"The favorable opinion expressed of this work by Chief Justice Willes, led
to five successive editions, and they experienced extensive and rapid sales."
By Richard Preston in his "Address to the Reader" prefixed to the seventh
edition of the "Touchstone" in 1820, p. IV., I cannot agree with this learned
writer that Doddridge is "now confessedly its author." See below.
2 A Short View of Legal Bibliography, 244-by Richard Whalley Bridge-
man, London, 1807.
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Sheppard also wrote "A Grand Abridgment of the Common and
Statute Law of England."
"Though not disreputable in its execution, it scarcely
struggled into existence against the superior work of Lord
Chief Justice Rolle."'
Surely the first English book on the law of Corporations, writ-
ten by so eminent a writer, one who also had charge, as clerk, of
the issuance of all municipal corporations, deserves examination
and recognition. It is strange that this book should have been so
forgotten. It seems to have been unknown to the writers on this
branch of law, or it has been ignored by them, since the cursory
reference to it in the preface to the anonymous book on corporations







OR, a Discourse, wherein
THE LEARNING
of the LAW touching Bodies-Politique is
unfolded, shewing the USE and NECESSITY
of that INVENTION, the ANTIQUITY,
various Kinds, Order and Government of the
same.
Necessary to be known not only of all Members
and Dependants of such Bodies; but of all





By William Shepheard, Sergeant at Law.
London, Printed for H. Twyford, T. Dring
and I. Place; and are to be sold at their
Shops in Vine-Court, Middle-Temple,
at the George in Fleet-Street,
and at Furnival's Inne-Gate
in Holborne, 1659.
'By Judge Story in a review of Dane's Digest in the North American Rev.
no. 411., July, 1826, p. 6.
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The list of Contents is as follows:
"Sect. I. What corporation is, and the kinds thereof.
Sect. II. Who may make it, and how it is made.
Sect. III. What persons may be Incorporated.
Sect. IV. By what name such persons may be Incorporated.
Sect. V. In what place a Corporation may be made.
Sect. VI. By what words a Corporation may be made.
Sect. VII. The Charter for Corporations divided in two parts
and opened.
Sect. VIII. What Ordinances a Corporation may make.
Sect. IX. The nature of a Corporation. And what it may have,
hold and do. And how."










The Chief Matters that
are usually contained in
them.
LONDON
Printed by J. Streater, for Thomas Dring
and H. Twyford, MDCLIX.
The paging is continuous and ends with page 187. The book
treats of municipal corporations principally, but it treats indiffer-
ently, as the title states, of corporations, fraternities and guilds,
thus plainly indicating that even so late as 1659 the distinctions
between them were imperfectly realized.
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On page 2 he gives the artificial classification of corporations
that still unfortunately obtains,' (sole and aggregate, ecclesiastical
and lay, eleemosynary and civil, etc.).
At page 3 Sheppard says:
"So also the Parishioners or Neighbours in a Parish, Village,
or Town, and the Church-wardens of every Parish :" (for) "some
purposes are in the eye of the Law corporations, aggregate of many
persons," failing to distinguish between true corporations and bodies
that have fallen out of the ranks in the march that has resulted in
incorporation-or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that
even in Sheppard's day, towns were not to be considered corpora-
tions, any more than were parishes, villages, or the church-wardens
of every parish. Unfortunately this confusion and uncertainty still
exist in the text books and authorities and is due to want of knowl-
edge of the origin of municipal corporations. Thus, in Beardsley
vs. Smith, i6 Conn. 368, the land of the town treated as an inde-
pendent political unit, Church, J., in the opinion, at p. 376, speaks
of towns and cities as "municipal or quasi corporations." On the
other hand, the recognition of towns as corporations in themselves,
not dependent upon .any external authority as their source, is ad-
mitted by Shaw, C. J., in Overseers of the Poor of Boston vs. Sears,
22 Pick. 122 at 13O:
'The artificial character of this classification is well pointed out in 2 Harv.
Law Rev. Io5.
" The most striking peculiarity found on first examination of business cor-
porations is the fact that different kinds of corporations are treated without
distinction as if the same rules were applicable to all alike. Subdivisions into
special kinds are indeed made, but the classification is based upon 'differences
of fact rather than on differences in legal treatment. Thus corporations are
divided into sole and aggregate. Again they are divided into ecclesiastical and
lay, and lay corporations are again divided into eleemosynary and civil. But
the division having been made, the older authorities, (e. g. Coke, in Sutton's
Hospital Case, io Rep. i; The Law of Corporations. i Blacks. Com. ch.
xviii; Kyd on Corporations) proceed to treat them all together, now and
then recording some minor peculiarity of a corporation sole or of an ecclesi-
astical corporation with one member capable."
The result has been the obscuring of the true differences between the
really different kinds of corporations and a failure to adopt some system of
classification based upon those real differences.
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"Towns were of themselves corporations having per-
petual succession, consisting of all persons inhabiting within
certain territorial lines." '
Sheppard's definition of "corporation" is broad enough to in-
clude all corporations and all kinds of corporations, without -refer-
ence to their origin. Page i, he says: "A Corporation or an In-
corporation (which is all one)' is a body in fiction of Law, or a
body Politick that endureth in perpetual succession."
This is broad enough to include the numerous corporations in
England that are commonly said to be corporations by prescription,
although many of them have numerous charters, 3 some of which
even antedate the time of legal memory, 189.'
It is even broad enough to include the self-created corporations
already then to be found in the American Colonies In New
1 " The manor and the township are the children of the village community.
Under the feudal system, the former, in England, has taken on, or has had
conferred upon it, the essential parts of the older organization and has left the
latter almost devoid of vitality. But when the English settlers brought over
to New England, and there established their system of town government, with-
out also establishing manors and lords of manors, they deprived their system
of that element that had contributed to its decay in England. I am therefore
inclined to attribute the success of town government in New England to its
perfect democracy-its omission of the aristocratic element under which, in
England the lord of the manor had absorbed the essential parts of the older
organization, the village community."
(The Literature of Local Institutions, Gomme; 1886, p. 171.) See also
Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies, Ed. by Adams, Series I-II-III-IV-VII,
etc.,-for studies of the beginnings of government, especially of local self-
government, in the American Colonies. American lawyers and courts too often
fail to apply the teachings therefrom to be derived, because they cannot find
them in the reported cases.
'Incorporation, the process or means whereby a corporation is formed,
and its final state, as distinguished from CorPoration, the artificial legal entity
thus formed,was evidently a distinction unknown to our author. His title page
speaks of "Forms and Presidents of Charters of Corporations" where we
should speak of" Charters of Incorporation."
3 Touro with 8 charters (Rep. of 1835 on the Mun. Corps. of Eng. & Wales,
655. Plympton Earle with 20 charters (do. S99).
4Beverly, with charters from the Archbishop of York, confirmed by Hen. I
(co to 1135) and Hen. II (ri54-ri89). Merewether & Stephens, 391.
5 i. e., Plymouth, settled in 1620; Salem, in 1625; Hartford, Windsor and
Wethersfield, in 2636; Providence, in 1636; Portsmouth, R. I. in 1637; New-
port, R. I., in 1638; Exeter, N. H.. in 1639; Dover, N. H., Hampstead, N. H.
and many others.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
England these self-constituted towns were the units of the political
system then taking shape. They were recognized by common con-
sent and finally by the colonial general assemblies or legislatures.'
The legislatures did not create these towns; they created themselves
and were afterwards acknowledged by the legislature.' Yet so
eminent an authority as Maitland' says:
"Ignorant men on board the 'Mayflower' may have
thought that in the presence of God and of one another,
they could covenant and combine themselves together into
a 'civil body politic.' Their descendants know better. A
classical definition has taught that "a corporation is a
franchise;" and a franchise is a part of the State's power
in the hands of a subject (Kent, Commentaries, Lect. 33);
'A Corporation is a franchise possessed by one or more
individuals, who subsist as a body politic under a special
denomination, and are vested by the law with the capacity
of perpetual succession, and of acting in several respects
as a single individual.' In its most extensive sense it'
(franchise) 'expresses every political right which can be
enjoyed or exercised by a freeman: in this sense, the right
of being tried by a jury, the right a man may have to an
office, the right of voting at elections, may, with propriety,
be called franchises; and in this sense, the right of acting
as a corporation may be called a franchise, existing col-
lectively in all the individuals of whom the corporation is
composed; in this sense, and in this sense alone, 'the fran-
chise of being a corporation,' can have any precise mean-
ing.'
These words seem to have been written as if in reply to Kent --
I Overseers of the Poor of Boston vs. Sears, 23 Pick. 122 (1839). See the
instructive opinion by Shaw, C. J.
'The two self-created towns in Rhode Island on the island of Aquidneck,
without any authority except of their own action, with no patent from England,
and with no title to the soil except what they bought of the Indians, at a
" General Court of Elections "held at Portsmouth in 1641, united and formed
themselves into a state, using that very term and adopting a state seal (i R. I.
Col. Recs. Ir2-150). When Channing (United States of America, 1897, p.
37) said, "Strong as was town organization, it was not older than the central
governments, and it cannot be said that the State was founded on the towns,"
he could not have had these facts in mind.
3 Political Theories of the Middle Ages, Otto Gierke, translated by Fr.
W. Maitland, in his introduction, xxxi.4But see i Kyd on Corps. 14.
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"To be a subject born, and to have Liberty and Privilege of a
Freeman, and no Villain, is a great Franchise; and therefore in
Law, when a Villain is made free, we say he is Infranchised, he
hath the Franchise, Liberty and Priviledge of being a Freeman."
-By Pollexfen in the case of the Quo Warranto against the City
of London, London, 1696, p. 97.
Classic though it be, the definition is not broad enough to include
all corporations, i. e., lands with certain bounds may be incor-
porated and there may not be an individual within those bounds.
There are therefore no "individuals possessing franchises" in such
a corporation. After the suppression of the monasteries by Henry
VIII, there were no "individuals possessing franchises" yet the
corporations were still in existence, although it was assumed they
were defunct.
Such strict adherence to a formal definition is also in conflict
with what the same learned writer, Maitland, says further, in the
same Introduction at p. 34, speaking of Anglo-Saxon or Teutonic
local self-government:
"And do you not think that some part at least of the
appalling mess-forgive us-the appalling mess that you
made of your local self-government, was due to a bad
foreign theory which, coupling corporateness with princely
privilege, refused to recognize and foster into vigor the
bodileness that was immanent in every English township,
in every rural Gemeinde? * * * that fatal blunder-
from which some of your less pedantic kinsmen in the
colonies kept themselves free when they suffered 'the
New England town' to develop its inherent corporateness."
(Page 38): "What is more, many foreign lawyers are
coming to the conclusion that in these days of free asso-
ciation, if a group behave as a corporation, the courts are
well nigh compelled to treat it as such, at least in the
retrospect. It is strongly urged that in such cases injustice
will be done unless corporateness is treated as matter of
fact, and American courts have made large strides in this
direction."
Now, as if in fulfillment of these prophetic words, comes the
decision in the House of Lords that a registered, voluntary associa-
tion may be sued as a body corporate.1
'Taff Vale Railway vs. Amalgamated Soc. of Railroad Servants, L. T. R.
July 22, x9oi, p. 698.
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In the Dartmouth College cases,' Marshall, C. J., gives, in terse
form, the often quoted definition of a corporation, as:
"An artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing
only in contemplation of law."
But this is not broad enough to include the many municipal
corporations that long existed, both in England and in the American
colonies, before they received legal recognition. Our division of
corporations into those de jure and those de facto is a recognition
of this, and a complete definition of "Corporation" must be broad
enough to include all corporations, as, for instance, "an imaginary
or fictitious perdurable entity, finally recognized by the law." If
we attempt a more precise definition we find that our precision will
exclude some recognized kind of a corporation.
For further definitions, none of which are, however, satisfactory,
see i Kyd on Corps., 13; Angell & Ames on Corps., secs. 1-2; Dillon
on Mun. Corps., secs. 18-9-20, 4th ed.; Morawetz on Priv. Corps.,
secs. I to 7, and others.
The curious scholastic reasoning in 2 Bulstrode 233 (1614)2 is
responsible for the misleading metaphysical doctrine that corpora-
tions have no souls, from which was drawn the conclusion that a
corporation cannot commit a trespass, cannot be guilty of treason,
etc. But why was it not held equally logical to conclude that a
corporation cannot promise and therefore cannot enter into a con-
tract?
It would be equally correct (and equally childish) to reason that
none can create bodies but God, but the King creates corporations,
therefore they have no bodies. Therefore a corporation has no soul
nor body. Having no soul nor mind, it can do nothing requiring
the exercise of mental powers; having no body it can have no mem-
bers and can do nothing requiring the exercise of physical powers.
It has no arms, no hands, etc. It cannot sign a deed nor affix the
corporate seal; nor can it express its intention to have these things
done for it. It cannot do anything.
On a par with this reasoning is that of Sir George Treby and
Mr. Pollexfen (both afterwards judges) in Quo Warranto against
the City of London, that as a corporation is an invisible body, it
cannot be sued.3 Such are some of the absurd results of the
1 4 Wheaton, 518 at 636.2
"None can create souls but God, but the King creates them" (corpora-
tions) "and therefore they have no souls."
3Merewether & Stephens, x8o2.
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following out to their logical conclusions the scholastic reasoning
of past ages.'
The truth is that corporations act both as to mental and physical
concerns, through agents thereunto appointed by charter or other-
wise. It follows that a corporation should be held liable for its
acts, mental or physical, material or immaterial, done by its agents,
acting within the scope of their authority, or if the corporation
authorized, directed, assented to or ratified such acts.
If any force is to be given to such reasoning as that in Bulstrode,
repeated by Coke in the case of Sutton's Hospital,' instead of
coming to the conclusion that a corporation has no soul, it would
be more correct to conclude that a corporation is nothing but a soul,
it being an immaterial entity, a persona ficta. Certainly it has no
body-an immaterial body is an absurdity beyond our compre-
hension.
"The core of the matter seems to be that for more or less numer-
ous purposes, some organized group of men is treated as a unit
which has rights and duties other than the rights and duties of
all or any of its members."
3
'"We now begin to hear a dogma (of which all English lawyers know a
vulgar version) that the universitas can be punished neither in this world nor in
the next, for that it has no soul nor body" (Pollock & Maitland, r Hist. Eng.
Law, 477.) Not until 1842 was it finally settled in England that a corporation
can commit a trespass. (Maund vs. Mon. Canal Co., 4 M. & G. 452)."
But see i Kyd on Corps., 223.
Grant on Corps., 278, commenting on Maund vs. Mon. Canal Co., cites
several cases from the Year Books holding corporations liable for trespass-of
-course these decisions are inconsistent with the reasoning of their time, but as
Grant well says; it being established that case would lie against a corporation,
it is remarkable that any doubt should ever have been felt as to trespass.
A corporation is but a name. Y. B. 21 Ed. IV. F. 13-pI. 4.
A corporation is but a person. Y. B. 32 H. VI. F. 9-pl. 13.
Combining the two, P. & M. say; (i Hist. Eng. Law, 474) "It is at once a
person and yet but a name; in short it is a persona ficta."
2 io Rep. 253.
3 P. & M., hist. Eng. Law, 488. It does not require a group of men,
however, to constitute a corporation. As before stated, p. 267, land within
certain stated bounds may be made a corporation, and there may not be an
inhabitant within those bounds. There may even be a corporation without
land or members. i. e., if an earthquake should swallow all the land of an
incorporated town or city with all its inhabitants, the corporation would still
continue. But Angell & Ames on Corps., sec. 768, p. 8oo, ioth ed. (1875),
still maintain that a corporation is dissolved by the death of all its members,
citing several authorities and decisions in support of the proposition. Surely
this is inconsistent with the modern idea of a corporation as a persona ficta
that exists independently of the existence of its members. And here again
we run. across the difficulty of attempting to adopt a rule applicable to all
kinds of corporations alike, for this mode of dissolution cannot apply to
pecuniary or business corporations. "The shares, being property, pass by
assignment, bequest or descent, and must ever remain the property of some
persons, who, of necessity, must be members of the corporation as long as it
may exist."-(By Morton, J., in Boston Glass Manufactory v. Langdon, 24
Pick. 49 at 52.
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This was adumbrated in the cases of the men of Dale" and of the
men of Islington. 2
It must be ever borne in mind that "from the time of the Nor-
man Conquest and downwards, the Cities and Towns of England
were vested either in the Crown or else in the Clergy, or in the
Baronage or great men of the Layety. That is to say, the
King was immediate Lord of some Towns, and Particular Persons
either of the Clergy or Layety were immediate Lords of other
Towns."'
In the first case we read: "Nota, que fut tenue en le Common
Bank que si le Roy done en fee ferme probis hominibus villae de
Dale, que le corporation est bon." In the second case: "It was
holden for law in the Star Chamber by Bromeley, Chief Justice,
Sir John Baker and others, that if the queen at this day would grant
land by her charter to the good men of Islington, without saying
to have to them, their heirs and successors, rendering a rent, this
is a good corporation forever to this intent alone, and not to any
other, etc. But then it seems they are only tenants at will: and if
the queen release or grant to them the said rent and fee-farm, it
should seem the corporation is dissolved ipso facto, for the rent and
farm was the cause which enabled the corporation, etc. Ideo
quaere." I
Charters of the same nature as these had long been granted by
lords of manors, both lay and ecclesiastic, and by Kings holding
manors as of their own demesne.'
I Y. B. 7 Ed. IV, Tr. Term 7 (1468). Shep. on Corps. 32.2Dyer, o0 (i553). Shep. on Corps. 36. Notice the dates. The latter case,
85 years later in point of time, reiterates the principle of the first one. Had no
more definite conception of incorporation arisen in all these years? Notice
too that in both cases there is no mention of either 'heirs' or ' successors' of
the grantees. If there was incorporation without either word, why the long
dispute afterwards, and contention that there can be no incorporation without
the magical word 'successors' ?
3 Madox, Firma Burgi, 4.4 This shows how essential to the idea of municipal incorporation fee-farm
rent was deemed.
5 See the many cases cited in "The Origin of Municipal Incorporation in
England and in the United States," by Amasa M. Eaton in the Annual Pro-
ceedings of the Am. Bar Assn. I 9o2-i. e., to Newport in Pembrokeshire in
1192 by Nichols, son of the lord of the barony of Kames (Rep. on Mun. Corps.
of 1835-Touro, do. 655); to Kilkenny in Ireland by the Earl of Pembroke in
1189 (M-. & S. 359); to Durham, between 1189 and 1199 by Hugh Pudsie,
Bishop of Durham (M. & S. 365); to Whitby by the abbot, confirmed by King
John (M. & S. 388); to Clithroe by the Earl of Lincoln, confirmed in 1229
by Ed. I. (M. & S. 545); to Newport by the Earl of Devon, between 1154 and
1189 confirmed by the Countess of Devon, between 1327 and 1377, confirmed 26
Ed. III. (M. & S. 771); to Tenby by William de Valencia and the Countess
Johanna his wife, by Aldomar de Valencia, confirmed by Lawrence de Hast-
ings. confirmed by Ed. III. and Rich. II. The borough was formally
incorporated by Eliz. in 1581 (M. & S. 817 and 818); to Plympton Earle by the
Earl of Devon in 124I, the Countess of Devon, incer, temfi., 13 Ed. III. (1339)and
seven later charters (Rep. on Mun. Corps. 596) etc., etc.
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If charters of this description issued by the King in the exercise
of his royal prerogative, were finally deemed by the courts to have
incorporated the grantees, then the same kinds of charters issued
by lords of manors must equally be deemed to have incorporated
the grantees, and no one has ever doubted the validity of such
incorporation by lords of manors.
Charters of this kind issued by lords of manors, were afterwards
confirmed by the King1 and charters of the same kind issued by
the King were occasionally confirmed by the lord of the manor.2
When James II, in dire straits for money, without again sum-
moning Parliament, resorted to Quo Warranto against the Municipal
Corporations of the realm, in order to compound for a partial
restoration of their rights upon payment of a higher fee-farm rent
or a large sum by way of fine, it never occurred to any of the
favoring sycophants and servile lawyers and judges about him,
that these municipalities were not true corporations and hence were
liable to forfeiture, under decree in Quo Warranto.
Sheppard's test of corporateness, irrespective of its origin, is
a broad one. After defining "corporation," he says (page 3) :
"Or, it is of many persons together. So Majors"
(Mayors) "and Commonalities, and all such kind of cor-
porations: Masters and Fellows of Colleges: and some
Guardians and Masters of Hospitals: and divers others,
where the succession is in many persons, are said to be a
body politick, so also the Parishioners or Neighbors in a
Parish or Village or Town and the Church wardens of
every Parish" (for) "some purposes are in the eye of the
Law, Corporations aggregate of many persons." 3
i. e., See the instances above cited, with many others in "The Origin of
Municipal Incorporation," etc., above cited.
2i. e., In 1527 Arthur Plantagenet, Viscount Leslie, vice-admiral of
England, reciting former grants, including one from William de Montacute,
confirmed by Hen. VIII., gave a charter to Poole, ratifying and confirming all
former grants (M. & S. 1125).
3 Various enquiries and remarks suggest themselves here: how can many
of these be considered corporations in the eye of the law unless the law
ignores its own doctrine that only the King can incorporate? Can it be that so
late as 659 when Sheppard wrote, the law considered all these incongruous
concerns as corporations? In the march towards incorporation, most of them
have since dropped by the wayside. The wonder is that even then, some of
them were considered as being in the procession.
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At page 4 our author continues:
"And so we say: A corporation is a body politick,
Authorized by the Lord Protector's Charter, to have a
Common Seal, Head Officer and Members; all of which
together are able by the Common consent, to grant, give,
receive or take anything within the Compass of their Char-
ter or to sue and be sued, as any one man may do, or be.
Or they are said to be an Assembly or Commonalty of
many men gathered or joyned together in a City, Town or
Borough into one Fellowship, Brotherhood or Mind, by
mutual consent, to support the Common Charge each of
other, and to live under such laws as they shall agree upon
to make, to be governed for their mutual good and advan-
tage in a perpetual succession."
But surely he cannot mean that there is no good incorporation
except by the Lord Protector's Charter (or the King's) for no one
pretends that some of the bodies mentioned above, as cited from page
3 of his book, have charters of corporation from any one. And if an
assembly of those gathered or joined together in a town or borough
into one fellowship constitute a corporation, it is to be noted that
this is not so broad as the definition on page 3, as it excludes parish-
ioners or neighbors in a parish or village and the church-wardens of
every parish, by including only those who join together in a town
or borough.
Following Coke, in his many inaccuracies in the case of Sutton's
Hospital, io Rep. i, our author, pages 6, 7 and 8, says that a
corporation may be made in four ways:
"i. By the Common Law; so the King was and Lord
Protector is, and many others are Bodies Politick.
2. By authority of Parliament; so the College of
Physicians in 14 H. 8. Chap. 5, was made a Corporation:
And so Sutton's Hospital was intended to be made.
"3. By prescription. That which hath been and con-
tinued time out of mind, a good Corporation: and hath
all the incidents and Badges of a good Corporation, shall
continue so, albeit they cannot show any charter for it.
For this doubtlesse was by Charter first, the which hath
been since lost.
"4. By Charter or Letters Patent of the King: And
so, most of the Corporations have been made. And so
they may and must be made at this day, or by act of
THE LAW OF INCORPORATION. 273
Parliament: And so by Charter; the Lord Protector may
make what Corporations he pleaseth; and without this
none can be Erected at this day."
With the sanction of the great name of Coke these statements
have been repeated ever since and now are accepted everywhere.
Nevertheless doubts may be expressed on two points.
The doctrine of charters "lost by time and accident" is a pure
fiction of the law, a notion of comparatively late date, the effect
of which has been to conceal the ignorance and indolence of those
promulgating it. It is not in accord with well-known facts.
When John de Waltham, Master of the Rolls temp. Rich. II
(377 to 1399), left office, he delivered all the records in his pos-
session to his successor, by an indenture minutely specifying every
document. When Merewether & StephensT wrote, in 1835, they
found every document there mentioned was still in existence. Con-
sidering this fact, as well as the minute particularity with which
every former charter is specified and recited in the very same words
in Inspeximus Charters succeeding them, it is in defiance of proba-
bility and fair presumption to assume that any charters have been
lost or that any ever were in existence not now to-be traced, either
by original or Inspeximus. There exist now in England municipal
corporations that are called and call themselves corporations by
prescription, although they have a string of charters in their
archives. 2
The second point of difference from Sheppard above reserved,
is his statement that no incorporation is good without the King's
charter. He relies upon the well-known case of Sutton's Hospital
and Coke's report of that case.3
The reasons for doubting the authority of this case are stated in
the paper read before the American Bar Association in 19o2, upon
the Origin of Municipal Incorporation, to which the reader is
referred. In brief, we find that in that case no distinction was
made between different kinds of corporations and that what may
be true of a private or quasi-private corporation like Sutton's Hos-
pital is not necessarily true of municipal corporations; that Coke
was one of the Governors and should not have sat in the case; that
he may have been influenced by his feeling against Bacon, who
was of counsel for the contestant; that his logic is bad and that
1 p. 774-
2 See cases cited in "The Origin of Municipal Corporations." ut sufira.
3 io Co. ia.
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his opinion and treatment of the case were not judicial. It is
enough to quote his own words: "Which brief report I have
made of these objections because I think them or the greater part
of them, were not worthy to be moved at the bar, nor remembered
at the bench; and that this case was adjourned to the Exchequer-
chamber by the Justices of the King's Bench, more for the weight
of the value, than for the difficulty of the law in the case." "And
all the arguments which have been made against this honourable
work of charity are hatched out of mere conceit and new invention
without any ground of law, and such which have any colour were
utterly mistaken."
Sec. III of Sheppard's book treats of the persons to be in-
corporated. He says, p. 1o: There must be persons to be incor-
porated; but we know this is not so-i. e.-land within certain
limits may be incorporated, or a corporation may be constittited by
joining corporations into one corporation. Indeed, when Sheppard
says: "Or the whole City, Town, Borrough or Village may be
incorporated," does he not concede that a corporation may be
formed without persons? I am inclined to think he does not, and
that what he means is that all persons in a city, town, borough or
village may be incorporated, for he proceeds: "Or a part of the
City, as the Burgesses of the Burrough, or the Freemen of the City
onely, may be Incorporated," plainly meaning that the members of a
particular class only may be constituted the corporation. The con-
ception that the city, town, borough or village of A should be a
corporation (without members), was evidently unknown to our
writer, I for he says further: "3 Trades-men of the City, or the
men of such a trade only, in the Town may be Incorporated." Hence
the incorporation of guilds and finally of trading and other business
companies, now called private corporations. This is, however, an
unscientific classification or designation, as all incorporation is of
public concern, and to call them private corporations is but to
conceal the power of the State over them. I cannot, therefore, agree
with the statement.
"The necessity for persons to compose the corporation, results
from the nature of things rather than from any rule of law. Per-
haps the same may be said of the importance of a name."2
"In the case of the Dutch West India Company v. Van Moses,
i Stra. 612, decided in 1724, it was held that the action was well
brought though no certain name had been given to the Company by
' Evidently Sheppard had no adequate conception of a corporation as a
"persona ficta."
Williston, Law of Business Corps. 2 Harv. Law Rev. 114. I cannot,
however, admit there is such a necessity.
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the Dutch States, the name being that by which it was actually
called."
This case is of course since Sheppard's day-but see the case
of Queen's College, Oxford, Dr. Ayray's case, ii Co. 18 b, ii Jas. I.
(1624), that had no name given it at its foundation, "but having
received their foundation and several other benefactions from the
Queen, they collected by reputation, the name of Queen's College,
by which name they sue and are sued." i Stra. 612, in the argument
for the Dutch West India Co. by Pengelly, Sergeant.
Sheppard proceeds, p. II:
"'4. The Head Officers, and Governours only, chosen
and to be chosen from time to time in the place, may be
Incorporate.
"5. In the case of Colleges, the persons incorporated
may be either the Governours alone, as Masters and Fel-
lows, and the like; or the Governours and Governed to-
gether; as Masters, .Fellows and Schollers of the Colledge.
"6. In case of Hospitals and Alms-houses, the persons
Incorporated may be the Governour or Governours, as
Masters or Guardians; or them, and the rest of the officers,
and poor, as the Founder shall desire, and the 'Lord Pro-
tector grant it."
But plainly the statutes 39 Eliz. ch. 5 & 21 Jas. I ch. I, the first
general incorporation act, gave a power to incorporate without
action by King or Parliament. Evidently so late as 1659, although
the act had been in force 62 years, its effect was not realized by our
writer. His statement on p. 12 also shows this, i. e.:
"The persons Incorporated in Sutton's Hospital were the Gov-
ernors thereof only." We should say now that the hospital was
incorporated and a power was given to the founder and his succes-
sors to appoint the Governors.
Section IV is entitled: "By what names such persons may be
incorporated."
By this Sheppard does not mean what name shall be used as the
name of the corporation, but whether the title shall be that of the
Mayor and Commonalty of - or that of the Mayor, Bailiffs
and Commonalty: or that of the Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty:
or that of the Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council: or that of the
Mayor, Citizens and Commonalty, etc. This seems puerile to us,
who incorporate the town or city of A, and then provide what
officers it shall have, their duties, terms of office, how elected, etc.
But of old the question was important because the terms used limited
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the class in which the civic power dwelt. By the exclusion of all
except those included within the letter of the terms used, and by
their having the exclusive power to elect their own successors, the
power to vote was taken away from or denied to the great body of
the burgesses or householders, and there resulted the evils of close
incorporation that contributed largely towards bringing local self-
government in the towns and boroughs of England into such a low
state at the time of the passage of the Reform Act in 1832. This
decay was further assisted by the doctrine adopted that the select
members thus held to constitute the corporation need not be residents.
Frequently, through insidious and unchecked abuse of power, a
town corporation became a close one, in spite of the express terms
of the charter.
"Albeit it be expressed in the charter, that the Choyce
of their Mayor, Bailiffs or other principal Officers, shall
be by the Commonalty, yet, if by a long usage they have
chosen them by a select number of the principal of the
Commonalty, or of the Burgesses, although no such con-
stitution can be shewed to warrant such Election, yet this
Election is good Law, being intended and presumed to
begin by common consent. Coo. 4, 77."'
This shows that even so late as 1659 municipal charters were
still considered as of little importance. It also shows an utter dis-
regard of the rule that parole testimony shall not be allowed to vary
the terms of a written document.
We have escaped the dangers of close incorporation in this
country through our acceptance of Democracy.
Next, pages 15, 16, 17, Sheppard treats of companies that may
be incorporated ("The Master or Governors and Commonalty of
I Sheppard on Corporations, 58. The case of Corporations, 4 Co. 77a here
referred to, is extrajudicial, however, the opinion being what we call an advis-
ory opinion only "Which question being of great importance and consequence,
was referred by the Lords of the Council to the Justices, to know the law in
this case" (loc. cit.) "As for the objection made from the resolution of the
Judges in the year 1583, I give these answers to it, that it was an extrajudicial
opinion; and though I must give reverence to the opinion of the judges, yet I
make a difference between cases adjudged upon debate and having counsel on
both sides, and resolution upon a case reported or referred to them." By Sir
Orlando Bridgman in Beckman vs. Maplesden, 0. Bridgman Rep. 6o at 78
(1662). This is the earliest case known to me pointing out the difference
between an advisory opinion and a judicial decision. On this subject see
further "The Duty of judges as Const. Advisers," H. A. Dubuque, 24 Am.
Law. Rev. 369; "1On the Origin and Scope of the Am. Doctrines of Const.
Law," 7 Harv. Law Rev. 153, Prof. Thayer, and "1Constitution Making in
Rhode Island," 26-Amasa M. Eaton.
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the Mystery of Cooks of London: The Masters and Wardens of
the Company of Pewterers in the City of London: The Company of
Merclwnt Taylors in London," etc.), the precursors of our business
corporations, which, fortunately for the stockholders, have not be-
come close corporations.
Then "The Colledges and Halls of Universities, and other like
places are, and may be, Incorporate by the names of Warden and
Fellows of, etc., in the County of, etc. Or, Provost, and Fellow;
or, Provost, Fellows and Schollers, or President and Fellows, or
President and Schollers; or Master and Fellows, or Principall and
Fellows; or Warden, Fellows and Schollers; or Warden or Schol-
lers; or Masters, Fellows and Schollers; or Master and Schollers,
or Keepers of the Colledge, and the Schollers of the same Colledge;
or any other such like Names."
This is given in full, to show that in spite of Sheppard's minute
particularity, it never occurred to him that a college might be
incorporated simply as A college, or the University of B, etc. These
and other sections also show that Sheppard failed, as indeed did
writers on corporations after him, fail for more than a century, to
distinguish between different kinds of corporations and to see that
rules of law applicable to one kind of corporations were inapplicable
to other kinds, and that while it might be true that only the King can
grant charters of some kinds, it was not true that only he could
grant charters of another kind. i. e. charters of municipal corporation.
The charters included in this section have not escaped close in-
corporation. We may note in passing, the efforts now being made
to enlarge the electorate, so as to include, at least the graduate
members of certain universities. Then will come the question of a
further enlargement, so as to include, at least for certain purposes,
their undergraduate members.
Sec. V, p. i8, "In what place a Corporation may be made,"
Sheppard says:
"The place there must be a place certain, where to fix and bot-
tome the corporation," giving examples. Yet he admits, p. 19,
there are corporations allowed to be good that were not so fixed,
as The Hospital of St. Lazer of Jerusalem in England, etc., citing
io Coke, 32, 33, spelling it Coo, as he always does, thus pointing out
its pronunciation in his day as Cook, the pronunciation still retained
in England.
"This requirement, apparently so fanciful, is explained
by the fact that the early corporations were almost all
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formed for local or special government of some kind, and
it was consequently necessary to designate the place where
the jurisdiction was to be exercised. The requisite must
very early have become merely formal in case of certain
classes of corporations, and might be fictitious." 1
Sect. VI, p. 21, treats of the words by which a corporation may
be constituted.
"If it be constituted and made by Charter, there must
be apt words therein for the making thereof, which are
the words commonly used in Charters for this purpose.
For a Town or Village. That the same Town or Village,
and all the inhabitants thereof be in Deed and Law one
body and perpetual Cominalty or Corporation, and In-
corporated by the name of, etc. Or thus: That the said
town of B. be and remain forever, a free Town of itself-."
This is undoubtedly good law, but it is in conflict with what he
has already said in Sec. IV. There is thus produced a state of con-
fusion that opened the door to the evils of close incorporation that
might have been escaped by adherence to the principle last above
enunciated.
No set of words are necessary to municipal incorporation, at
least, and this is in conformity with its origin. The question really
is, what was the intention of the parties, of the burgesses or house-
holders on the one part, and the lord of the manor and afterwards
the King, on the other part. When these charters were first granted
there was undoubtedly no intention to create a corporation, as
neither party knew what a corporation was, nor that there was
such a thing as a corporation. But out of the relationship entered
into, municipal incorporation finally resulted by a process of develop-
ment, ignored at the present day and in great measure by the writers
of the past.
In another connection Sheppard has already stated, p. 13, that
corporations need not any certain words: "for they may be made by
almost any intelligible words, importing the matter intended."
I Williston, Law of Business Corps. 2 Harv. Law Rev. ii5. It furnishes
us also with an illustration of the confusion brought about by the failure to dis-
tinguish between different kinds of corporations, and the consequent misappli-
cation of rules, valid as to one kind of corporation, as valid to all kinds. Prof.
Williston well points out, also, that as the purposes for whicb'corporations were
instituted became more varied, and the mode of thought of lawyers became
more reasonable, less stress was laid on this formality. Already in "The
Law of Corporations" published in 1702, it is hardly mentioned, Blackstone,
(Com. Bk. i, ch. xviii) only refers to it, and Kyd (ist vol. 228) says, "It is
generally denominated of some place."
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At p. 23, following Coke in the case of Sutton's Hospital, he says:
"And there is no necessity that there should be the words Fundo,
Erigo or Stabilio, used for the Erection of the Corporation in any
case; but it may be done by other apt words also." Summing up
P. 37, Sheppard says: "i. That an Incorporation may be made
with few words and that there is no certain form of words for it."
It is the intention of the parties and not any set form of words
that creates incorporation. Therefore the voluntary agreements of
the first settlers in New England, without other than their self-
asserted authority, to associate themselves together as bodies politic
and corporate did constitute them corporations. The hesitation to
credit them with this capacity is due to long continued prevalence
of the erroneous doctrine that only the King can incorporate.
It is also due, in part, to the continued prevalence of the incorrect
doctrine (assumed, if not always expressly stated) that the grant
of a charter of incorporation is the exercise of a sovereign power.
The facts of history do not support this view. On the contrary,
it is a fact that many towns exist in England that have always
been admitted to be valid corporations, although they held only
charters from the lord of the manor. It is also ihe fact that the
self-incorporated towns of New England were admitted to be corpo-
rations by legislatures and by courts. Of old, then, incorporation
was not the exercise of a sovereign power, whatever incorrect view
may now prevail. The importance of this question is apparent, for
if my views are correct, Congress may grant charters of incorpora-
tion of all kinds, regardless of the fact that the Constitution does
not give it such power.
The timidity of Congress in exercising this power is remarkable.
It has incorporated but few private or business corporations, i. e.
Columbian College, Steam Packet Company, National Institute,
National Hotel Company, Hiram 0. Alden and James Eddy, their
associates and assigns, to construct a telegraph line from the Mis-
sissippi River to the Pacific Ocean (here is a national corporation
without a name!), Grand Lodge of Independent Order of Odd
Fellows, Union Pacific Railroad Company, National Academy of
Sciences, the American Historical Association, etc. The list of 48
of these corporations, all there then were, may be found in Senate
Report No. 803, 53d Congress, 3d Session, Jan. 22, 1895. Most of
these charters timidly state that the corporation is created in the
District of Columbia, and contain a provision that the corporation
shall have an office in the District, seemingly to make it appear that
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Congress is only exercising its power to create a corporation in the
District, which it has undoubted power to do. In the opinion of the
writer, whenever it is proposed to create a corporation that from
its nature is national in its scope and objects, such as the Union Paci-
fic Railroad Company, among the above, or the American Irrigation
Company, the Mississippi River Improvement Company, the Ameri-
can Educational Union, the American Historical Association, the
Colonial Dames (refused by Congress, but largely because the
members of rival societies fought each other so bitterly), the Order
of the Cincinnati, etc., etc., Congress has power to grant a charter
of incorporation, and is under no legal obligation to provide that
any such a corporation shall have an office in the District of Colum-
bia. On the contrary, if such be the wish of the incorporators and
the will of Congress, such charters may provide for an office in
every State of the Union, or in one State only.
Plainly, no charter by any one State or by more than one, that is,
by several States, can create a national corporation-such as a
national bank.
Sheppard then treats of the charters of Sutton's Hospital, p. 24;
the Hospital of Edward VI. in Mondon, p. 26; the Colledge of
Physicians, p. 27; the Chauntry-house in London, p. 28; Sacum,
in Wilts, p. 29; Queen's Colledge in Oxford, p. 3o; the Savoy, p. 32;
the Worsted Weavers of Norwich, p. 33; the Society for the Propa-
gation of the Gospel in New England, p. 35, and the charter to
the honest men of the village of Islington, p. 36. Their mere
mention emphasizes his failure to distinguish between the different
kinds of corporations, a failure that has left mischievous conse-
quences even now. On p. 31 he gives a summary of the Stat. 39
Eliz. ch. 5, revised and made perpetual by Stat. 21 Jas. I, ch. I-the
first of our general incorporation acts.
In concluding this section he says:
"i. That an incorporation may be made with few
words and that there is no certain form of words for it.
That it may be made absolute and perfect at the first, or
with Reference to somewhat after to be done to perfect
it. This one is of the Substance, and must be expressed,
or strongly implyed by the words, That the Lo. Protector
doth give leave to make such a Corporation.' That in
How was it possible to maintain such a doctrine in 1659 with the acts of
39 Eliz. ch. 5 and 21 Jas. I. ch. i-in force?
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such a place certain, such a house shall be built for such a
use, and such a Government and Governours shall be of
and in it. And those persons shall be a corporation to
continue for ever by such a name.
"2. Sometimes the King himself did express the words,
design the place, appoint the number, and name all in the
charter, so that it is a Compleat Corporation, and nothing
is left for the Founder or Donor, but to make an Endow-
ment of Lands. And sometimes the King by his Charter
reserves as well the nomination of the persons, as the
name of the Incorporation to the Founder. And that when
he hath declared it in writing, according to his authority,
then they are Incorporate by the Letters Patent of the
King, as if it had all been put into the Letters Patent."
The next section, VII, is entitled, "The Charter for Corporations
divided into parts and opened." Among things "declaratory or
explanatory, and inserted only in point of discretion, and for
conveniency" he mentions, p. 41 :
"So the Clauses, to buy and sell, sue and be sued, have
and use a common Seal, to restrain alienation or demise
of the land belonging to the Corporation. That the Sur-
vivors shall be Incorporate. That if the revenues increase,
they shall be employed to the publique use of the Cor-
poration. To be visited by the Governours. To make
Ordinances, That the Ordinary shall not visite it, License
to purchase in Mortmain, and some general Clauses and
Provisoes. The Corporation is well made without all this."
Among the things not "at all incident to Corporations, but Com-
monly granted to them when they are erected," he mentions, p. 42:
"Felon's goods, and of fugitives, and persons out-lawed
in Civil Actions, The Forfeitures by Penal Statutes, Recog-
nizances, Hundreds, Courts and Conuasance of Pleas,
Fairs, Markets, Wayfs, Estrayes, Treasure Trove, Deo-
dands, Exemptions from serving in Offices, Juries, pay-
ment of Toll, Picage, etc. The Assise of Bread and Beer,
Pillory and Tumbrell, The Office of the Justice of Peace,
Coroner, Clerk of the Market, and a great part of the
Sheriff's Office and the like."
On p. 43 he says:
"3. There are some things often inserted in these
Charters that are unlawful; as, to make Ordinances to
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imprison men; or to forfeit goods upon disobedience; or
to restrain the liberty of Trade, and such clauses as restrain
the Corporation having of that which is incident to it,
and the like."
Sheppard fails to point out here or elsewhere the difference in
this respect between a charter granted by the King and one granted
by Parliament. The Courts may declare certain provisions of the
charter of the King to be unlawful, but they have no such power
if the charter be one granted by Parliament. If such a charter
should contain a provision that all actions against the corporation
should be tried and determined by its directors sitting as a court and
without a jury, under the English constitution where is there any
power to declare such a provision unlawful.Th
It follows therefore that a charter granted by Parliament is
more valuable than one granted by the King. The theory being
that only the King can incorporate and that when Parliament
incorporates it does so as the representative or agent of the King,
the charter of the agent being of superior efficacy to that of the
King, it follows that the agent, the inferior, is superior to the
superior in this respect. Such is one of the results of the theory
that only the King can incorporate.
On p. 44, Sheppard writes an important principle. "i. That all
these Charters have the most favorable interpretation in Law that
can be. And they shall be taken strongly against the Lo. Pr. and
to advance the work intended by it."
This salutary principle is ignored in the numerous American
cases, holding, generally, however, only by way of dictum, that
municipalities are purely creatures of the legislature and are subject
to their will. 2
t But see the statement by Holt, C. J. in City of London vs. Wood, 12 Mod.
669: " What my Lord Coke says in Bonham's Case in his 8 Co. (" For when
an act of parliament is against common right and reason, and repugnant, or
impossible tolbe performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such
act to be void," 8 Co. 118a) is far from any extravagancy, for it is a very reason-
able and true saying, that if an act of parliament should ordain that the sameperson should be party and judge, or which is the same thing, judge in his
own cause, it would be a void act of parliament-. An act of parliament
may not make adultery lawful, that is, it cannot make it lawful for A. to liewith the wife of B. ; but it may make the wife of A. to be the wife of B. anddissolve her marriage with A." See further the note and authorities cited inthe editions of Coke's Reports by J. H. Thomas & J. Q. Fraser, London, 1826,
vol. 4-PP. 375 and 376.
2 See the authorities cited in "The Origin of Municipal Incorporation"
and in the series of articles on," The Right to Local Self Government," byAmasa M. Eaton in the Harvard Law Review, igoo.
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After advising his readers to "follow the draught now generally
used in the making of these Charters" Sheppard proceeds, p. 45,
to consider the several parts of a charter, with general forms for a
town charter, p. 46, and for a hospital charter, p. 48. Then follows
some repetition as to unnecessary powers, as, p. 52, to sue or be
sued, p. 53, to hold in mortmain, but see p. 54, "Onely this, for
Land of Inheritance if the Corporation purchase of this without
license of the Lo. Pro. it is in danger to lose the land upon the Statute
of Mortmain," which means probably that as to lands embraced by
the charter, the charter itself is authority to the corporation to hold
them forever, notwithstanding the statutes of mortmain; but it
requires the license of the King to take title to land afterwards.
So, p. 55, the usual clause giving power to use a common seal
is unnecessary.
P. 56: "It is usual in these Charters by way of grant
or Direction from the King, to set down all the forms of
Government, the numbers and names of their Chief, and
other Officers, whereof their Common Council shall be
made up, and what Officers and Members there shall be,
how chosen, sworn, continued, and remoted, to this pur-
pose: That there shall be a Mayor, Recorder, 6 Aldermen
and Common-Council. That 20 be chosen out of the in-
habitants for the Common-Council. That out of these the
Mayor and Aldermen shall be chosen. That 12 of these
20 (whereof the Mayor, Recorder, or four of the Alder-
men, or any two of them, to be two), shall make a Common-
Council to make orders, etc. How and when they shall
meet. To appoint what Officers shall be in the whole
Corporation: To say, that there shall be besides the Mayor,
Aldermen, Recorder, Justices of the Peace, a Custos Rotu-
.orum, a Town Clerk, Clerk of the Market, and Coroner,
Clerk of the Peace, two Chamberlains, a Sword-bearer,
two Sergeants at the Mace, one Bayliff, a Clerk of the
Statutes, two High Constables, etc. To appoint how offi-
cers and members shall be from time to time Elect. To
name the present Mayor, Aldermen, Recorder, Council-
men, and Officers. To set down what shall be done to
them that refuse the office or place being chosen; How
they shall be sworn, continue in their place, or be removed
upon death or misdemeanor, and others put in. And so
otherwise as the Government is constituted.
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"i. All this we look upon as not necessary to be
inserted in the charter, for they are not of the essence, for
they may govern themselves without this; or, haply, they
may do it in another manner than is set down; but it is
providently done, and the best way to insert and express
it in such a manner and such words as is usual, let them
be of what force they will in law."
This extract, given in full, shows that, dropping out of sight
for the time being all other kinds of corporations, Sheppard was
now writing particularly of municipal corporations, the kind with
which we might suppose him to be most familiar, remembering'
that in 1656 he was made one of four clerks appointed to draw up
charters granted by Cromwell to town corporations. Note also that
he says, not only that municipal corporations may do all these things
without express powers conferred in their charters, but further,
even if so set down in their charters, they may exercise such powers
in a different way from that set down. This is good proof from
contemporaneous authority, a man with knowledge of law and an
officer of the law for the issuance of these charters, that at that
time the municipal corporations of England enjoyed a measure of
local authority that would be denied to them by the courts of this
country, holding that they have no powers except such as are, con-
ferred upon them by the legislature. For here we find that in
the face of express authority to do these specified things in specified
ways, they may do them in other ways that are not specified. That
is to say, Sheppard considered such provisions not to be mandatory,
and he held that in spite of them a town may regulate its own
government by other officers than those provided in the charter.
A fortiori, neither parliament nor King should have a right to
interfere in the management of the town's local affairs under its
own by-laws. Under the democratic system of the United States,
this salutary principle should certainly be recognized. 2
P. 58: "2. Albeit it be expressed in the Charter, that the choyce
of their Mayor, Bayliffs, or other principal officers, shall be by
the Cominalty, yet, if by a long usage they have chosen them by a
select number of the principal of the Cominalty, or of the Burgesses,
although no such constitution can be shewed to warrant such elec-
1 p. 259 ante.2This is not a denial of the right of the legislature to pass any general
laws.that may be necessary.
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tion, yet this Election is good Law, being intended and presumed
to begin by common consent. Coo. 4- 77."
This is most remarkable ! It shows that charters were con-
sidered of very little account-of which we have other evidence,
witness the constant renewal and confirmation of charters upon the
accession of a new lord of the manor or of a new king.
It also shows utter disregard of the rule, now accepted, that
parol testimony shall not be allowed to vary the terms of a written
document.
Such a doctrine led inevitably to close incorporation and all
its evils. In this country we have fortunately escaped them, through
our acceptance of the principles of democracy. We inaugurated a
system of town government without the evil results following from
the dominion of a lord of the manor, or of a King. We are creating
new evils, however, by substituting the absolute power of the legis-
lature over towns and ignoring all limits to that power.
After discussing the provision for Justices of the Peace in the
town charter and whether they shall consist of the Mayor, Aldermen
or Ancient Aldermen, etc., or shall be chosen by the corporation
every year, Sheppard concludes, p. 61: "For we cannot approve
the Election of Justices by the Corporation." In New England
this right has been jealously guarded. In Rhode Island so.highly
is it valued, it is expressly reserved in the Constitution, Art. X,
sec. 7:
"The towns of New Shoreham and Jamestown may
continue to elect their wardens as heretofore. The other
towns and the City of Providence may elect such number
of justices of the peace, resident therein, as they may deem
proper. The jurisdiction of said justices and wardens
shall be regulated by law. The justices shall be com-
missioned by the Governor."
When Sheppard wrote, had be but known it, he had but to look
across the ocean to find the election of justices of the peace by the
self-instituted corporations here established, rather than by a select
body out of their own number, to be working successfully. But
what Englishman of that century would have thought of looking
here for political guidance!
So, p. 7o, he thinks it is not so safe to make the Coroner and
Clerk of the Market eligible by the Corporation, but rather to make
the head-officer to be these, in the charter itself. Evidently our
writer had not faith in Democracy.
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P. 6i, Sheppard says:
"It is usual to insert a clause to prohibit the Justices
of the Peace of the County, to intermeddle there in any-
thing concerning the office. So for the Sheriff, Clerk of
the Market, and Coroner's office. And this is useful and
sufficient to keep them out from intermeddling there."
This recognizes, impliedly, the right to local self-government.
Had this suggestion been followed in the municipal charters after-
wards issued, even this slight admission of the right to local self-
government might have contributed towards prevention of the ob-
livion of this right that now obtains.
(To be continued in our Afrii issue.)
